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Abstract: 
Dyson and Moore (1983) posit that women in South India enjoy relatively more agency than in 
the North. Their conclusions have become part of the standard picture of Indian rural society. 
In this paper, we examine using experimental data the implications of the regional contrast in 
female autonomy for the efficiency of family decision-making. We take a sample of 1200 
couples from one rural and one urban area in the north of India (Uttar Pradesh) and one area 
in the south (Tamil Nadu) that are often taken to exemplify differences in the autonomy of 
women and the nature of marital relationships. Generally, we find large-scale and robust 
evidence of inefficiency and the hiding of assets when this is possible. Men invest more and 
are more generous to their partners. Women are more willing to invest in a common pool 
when their income is earned through working and when assets are publicly observable.  
 
Regarding the focus of our paper, we find continuing significant differences between North 
and South and we find relatively little evidence that urban living is associated with changes in 
the nature of marital behaviour. There are some differences between response to treatment 
but the key and striking difference between the North and the South is that in both rural and 
urban sites in the former region household efficiency is considerably greater than in the latter, 
which does on the face of it suggest a tradeoff between autonomy and efficiency. 
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Introduction.
*
 
Dyson and Moore (1983) posit that women in South India enjoy relatively more agency than in 
the North. In this paper, we examine using experimental data the implications of the regional 
contrast in female autonomy for the efficiency of family decision-making. In theory, 
independent spousal resource allocation decisions do not need to give rise to household 
inefficiency. For instance, a greater degree of female autonomy could lead to more weight 
being given to her preferences in a bargained, but still Pareto-efficient outcome. However, 
spousal autonomy (compared to a unitary household model) does give rise to the possibility 
of inefficiency. When spouses independently control resources, there is opportunity for 
miscoordination, for the undersupply of household public goods  as well as the chance to 
pursue the fulfilment of individual preference by hiding some income or consumption. All this, 
creates the potential for sub-(Pareto)optimal household resource allocation decisions. 
 
We take as our point of departure, and as the basis for our site selection, the Dyson and 
Moore thesis of relatively greater female autonomy in the South, and examine the implications 
for household efficiency. Though the details of their research have been widely queried, their 
broad conclusions have become part of the standard picture of Indian rural society. Following 
Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001), we take a sample of 1200 couples from two areas in Uttar 
Pradesh (UP) in the north of India and one area in Tamil Nadu (TN) in the south that 
exemplify differences in the autonomy of women and the nature of marital relationships. 
However, since the continued validity of the Dyson and Moore thesis has recently been 
questioned (Rahman and Rao, 2004), we use extensive interviews with almost all husbands 
and wives in our sample (interviewed separately) in order to verify that our sites typify the 
North-South contrast as it is normally held to be in the literature. In particular, we check 
whether the three avenues we focus on through which spousal autonomy could lead to 
inefficiency – private endowments, the possibility to hide these, separate spheres of decision-
making – are significantly different between our northern and southern sites. Each of these 
avenues is explored separately in our experimental design. 
 
In our baseline experiment, couples play a standard public good game, with private, secret 
endowments, a voluntary contribution mechanism and a fixed sharing rule of the common pot. 
Our key treatments allow us to examine the impact on efficiency of earning endowments (to 
mimic the situation of greater entitlement to one’s own resources), public endowments (to 
                                                 
*
 This study forms part of “The Intra-Household Allocation of Resources: Cross-Cultural Tests, 
Methodological Innovations and Policy Implications”, a project jointly funded by the UK’s 
ESRC and DFID (RES-167-25-0251). As such the work has benefited greatly at all stages 
from the expertise and close cooperation of the other members of the team, Cecile Jackson 
and Nitya Rao. We are especially thankful to the hard-working efforts of our fieldwork 
manager, Matthew Osborne, and our local teams, led by Dr Biswarupa Gosh, Dr Pradip K. 
Sen, and Dr Anup K. Mishra in Uttar Pradesh, and Dr R. Naagarajan in Tamil Nadu, both 
under the guidance of Prof. Amaresh Dubey, from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New 
Delhi. We are also grateful for helpful comments received from seminar participants at FASID, 
Tokyo, Tokyo Institute of Technology and the Economic Science Association meetings in 
Melbourne, 2010 and Kuala Lumper in 2011. 
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create a contrast with the baseline in which resources can be hidden), and control of the 
allocation (to measure whether inducing autonomy experimentally through transferring 
agency matters for male and female contributions). 
 
Generally, we find large-scale and robust evidence of inefficiency and the hiding of assets 
when this is possible. Men invest more and are more generous to their partners. Women are 
more willing to invest in a common pool when their income is earned through working and 
when assets are publicly observable. Regarding the focus of our paper, we find continuing 
significant differences between North and South and we find relatively little evidence that 
urban living is associated with changes in the nature of marital behaviour. There are some 
differences between response to treatment (e.g. female contributions respond to endowments 
being public only in the South, and male investment to male control of the allocation only in 
the North) but the key and striking difference between the North and the South is that in both 
rural and urban sites in the former region household efficiency is considerably greater than in 
the latter, which does on the face of it suggest a trade-off between autonomy and efficiency. 
The result does not of course imply that female autonomy is not worth having, nor to ignore its 
numerous rewards (e.g. Anderson 2009). It is simply to point out that there may be a price to 
pay for these good things in that household decision-making is less efficient. 
 
 
 
Background: India’s North-South divide in female autonomy 
 
Although in a context of overall low female autonomy (compared to much of the rest of the 
world), a North-South divide has often been remarked on that shows in the northern and 
north-western parts of India having both distinct kinship systems and demographic regimes, 
including adverse-to-females sex ratios, that are consistent with less female say in household 
decisions, mobility and entitlement to resources than in the southern and south-eastern parts 
of the country (Sopher 1980; Miller 1981; Dyson and Moore 1983; Jejeebhoy 2001; Jejeebhoy 
and Sathar 2001; Agnihotri et al. 2002). The most influential characterisation of the northern 
and southern kinship systems in terms of their implications for female autonomy and 
demographic outcomes is that of Dyson and Moore (1983). For this purpose, they make use 
of an authoritative review of the ethnographic literature for India until about 1950, which 
focuses on kinship; and the extent of women’s autonomy – defined as their ‘decision-making 
ability with regard to personal affairs,’ which include the affairs of one’s intimates, and with 
access to information singled out for explicit mention as a component of decision-making 
ability (ibid.: 45) – is inferred from the nature of the kinship system.
i
 
 
Thus the northern kinship system is characterised as favouring the internal cohesion of 
patrilineally related groups of males that resolve tensions/forge alliances with other such 
groups through the simultaneous and uni-directional transfer of resources (dowry) and female 
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virgins: upon marriage, women leave their natal kinship network to join that of their husbands, 
after which their movements and sexuality are strictly controlled. By contrast, the southern 
kinship system is said to rely on the reciprocal exchange of women between groups and 
favours cross-cousin, village-endogamous marriage, so married women do not tend to stray 
far from their blood relatives. In this depiction of it, the northern compared to the southern 
kinship system is obviously responsible for lower female mobility and exposure to the outside 
world, and plausibly for lower female labour force participation, higher fertility, higher female-
to-male infant and child mortality (and therefore worse overall sex ratios), and less female say 
in household and personal decisions and entitlement to household resources (Sopher 1980; 
Miller 1981; Dyson and Moore 1983; Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001). 
 
For reasons that are slightly suspect (since they acknowledge the potential ultimate primacy 
of economic factors), Dyson and Moore have come to be associated with a school of thought 
that favours a cultural over an economic explanation for India’s North-South divide in female 
autonomy. Others have emphasised the agro-ecological determinants of female economic 
worth, specifically the higher demand for female labour in wet-rice than in wheat growing 
areas, which would lead to a lower valuation of women in the North (Bardhan 1974; Miller 
1981; Miller 1984). Whatever the historical veracity of that view, it could not explain present-
day regional variation in gender discrimination patterns other than through a lingering 
persistence in culture, which argues for the more immediate usefulness of the cultural 
explanation.
ii
 
 
Yet others, while not disputing that kinship systems critically influence female autonomy, 
doubt that Dyson and Moore’s classification of Indian states accordingly, based as it is on 
ethnographies no later than the first half of the twentieth century, continues to be valid today 
(Rahman and Rao 2004). Using a survey administered in 1995 among 800 married women 
(in total) in the southern state of Karnataka and the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, both 
labelled without reservation by Dyson and Moore as typifying respectively the southern and 
northern kinship systems, Rahman and Rao find that female autonomy is worse in some 
respects in the North (influence over decisions about fertility and children’s health and 
education) but better in others (expenditure decisions). Crucially, they find that the average 
distance between a wife’s natal and current homes is not significantly different between the 
two states. In other words, they cast doubt on both parts of Dyson and Moore’s (composite) 
thesis: that female autonomy is higher in the South, and that this is due to the continued 
relative nearness of the natal kinship network. 
 
Rahman and Rao’s (2004) study uses purposively selected districts, five in Karnataka and 
five in Uttar Pradesh, and is not designed to be representative for those states, let alone for 
‘the’ South and ‘the’ North of India. Their findings are better taken as a reminder that the 
Dyson-Moore classification is based on ideal types and will not be universally corroborated 
rather than as evidence for its being out of date. Indeed, another study, using a very similar 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 10-33
 - 6 - 
questionnaire, and a larger sample, based on fieldwork carried out a year before that of the 
Rahman-Rao study, again for the northern state of Uttar Pradesh and this time for the 
southern state of Tamil Nadu, found female autonomy to be considerably better in all key 
respects in the latter state:
iii
 “A clear regional divide, net of individual and household 
characteristics is evident in almost every index of autonomy: decision-making authority, 
mobility, access to and control over economic resources, and, to a lesser extent, freedom 
from threat by husbands. Women in Tamil Nadu experience far greater autonomy than 
women in [J] Uttar Pradesh.” (Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001: 708). Our sites are purposively 
selected, in these same two states, in order to capture the North-South divide sketched above, 
but in the light of the contradicting findings from recent studies, site selection clearly needs to 
be validated, which we do using survey data, very similar in kind to those Rahman and Rao 
(2004) use, on the extent of female autonomy in a number of key respects. Our reasoning 
here is simply that we can only hope to shed light on the regional contrast we are interested in 
using experimental methods when we can be confident that we have captured the North-
South divide using the more traditional questionnaire-based methods. In our view, while the 
survey data are used to validate our site selection, they are neither epistemologically superior 
nor inferior to the experimental data.
iv
 
 
 
Autonomy versus Efficiency. 
It is useful to outline a theoretical model in which autonomy and efficiency are potentially in 
conflict. Given the complexity and dynamism of real household environments, we do not claim 
to be testing this theory, but it provides some further motivation for our experimental 
investigation. Suppose there are n+1 goods in the household, xi  i = 1,J,n . We write u(x) as 
the continuous and quasi-concave utility function for the wife and v(x) as the corresponding 
function for the husband, where x is the vector of goods, with associated price vector, p. It is 
useful to think of x0 as a purely private good consumed by the wife and x1 as a purely private 
good for the husband. All other goods are in theory household goods, providing benefits to 
both partners. Though in practice some goods may be of direct value only to one person, they 
may be indirectly valued by the other partner for the benefits brought to their spouse. In other 
words, this formulation allows for household goods which are clearly jointly consumed (e.g. 
heating) and for other-regarding preferences. We assume that there is at least one household 
good that is always positively valued by both spouses. Total household expenditure is y, 
which is the sum of three non-negative components: y
h
, y
f
 and y
m
 where h, f and m refer to 
household, female and male budgets respectively. The allocation of goods is decided in a 
two-stage game. In the first stage, husband and wife separately allocate their own budgets to 
maximize individual utility. Note that both parties can purchase any of the goods and total 
consumption is the sum of individual purchases, x
f
 and x
m
. In the second stage the household 
chooses x
h
 to maximize the weighted sum of individual utilities, W(x) λu(x)+(1-λ)v(x) (0 < λ < 
1) subject to the constraints that px
h
 ≤ y
h
, x = x
h
 +  x
f
 + x
m
 and 0 ≤ x
h
.  Another way of 
representing this is that the household chooses x subject to the constraints that px ≤ y and x ≥   
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x
f
 + x
m
. Either way, it is as if the spending chosen by the individual partners can be topped up 
by the household but not reduced. Thus the first stage of the game provides constraints on 
the possible values of x in the second stage and when allocating their individual budgets, both 
spouses anticipate this. The model is therefore a close relative of the separate spheres model 
proposed by Lundberg and Pollak, 1994. In their model, the solution to the household’s 
resource allocation problem comes from the Nash bargaining solution, rather than maximizing 
W(x). The fallback positions in their model are provided by the solution to a non-cooperative 
game in which each spouse controls the allocation of resources to one (or more) household 
public goods. This game therefore corresponds to the first stage of our model albeit that in our 
model spouses can contribute to any and all household public goods.
v
 Because the individual 
budgets in our model give the spouses some power over the way the house allocates its 
resources, they can be interpreted as measures of autonomy. Specifically, when y
f
 = 0, the 
wife has zero autonomy over spending and more generally, a higher value of y
f
 (y
m
) for given 
y indicates a higher level of autonomy for the wife (husband) in the household.  
 
With regards to x*, the equilibrium pattern of expenditure, there are two cases to consider: 
first the individual budgets may be sufficiently low that they place no restrictions on the value 
of x in the second stage. In this case the equilibrium value of x* = x** , where x** is defined as 
the value of x that maximizes W(x) subject to px ≤ y. Since x** is, by construction, Pareto 
efficient then x* is also Pareto efficient. In the second case, individual budgets and 
preferences are such that x* ≠ x** - i.e. the constraint, x ≥   x
f
 + x
m
 is strictly binding. Now 
when y
m
 =y
f
 = 0, then clearly x* = x**, the equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Conversely, Dubey 
(1986) shows that when y
m
 +y
f
 = y, then x* is generically strictly Pareto inefficient.
vi
 Thus 
autonomy and efficiency are inversely related.
vii
  
 
A key question is what factors determine y
f
 and y
m
. Income received and how it is acquired, 
may be important variables, along with social norms, the claims of others in the household 
and measures of bargaining power such as proximity of relatives, legal rules on individual 
property and divorce (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009). The potential for income or assets to be 
hidden may also be influential, inasmuch as a spouse who can hide income may need to be 
given some control over its allocation in order to induce him or her to reveal it to the 
household. In our experimental treatments we manipulate some of these factors (see below), 
though it is not clear that deeply established practices in a marriage, such as the level of 
autonomy, can be easily manipulated in an experimental setting. In other words, our prime 
focus is on the geographical comparison. 
 
 
Design. 
Across the three sites we have five treatments in common which we introduce as follows: 
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1. Investment baseline. Both partners have endowments and can make investments. 
The pool is split equally after we add 50%. 
2. Female control – both subjects have endowments and can make investments, but the 
women control the allocation of the pool. 
3. Male control – as above, but with male control of the allocation. 
4. Public endowments. As for the investment baseline, but with endowments revealed 
publicly. 
5. Production with investment – in this treatment subjects earn their endowments, but 
can then invest in the pool in the same format as treatment 1. 
In addition we use a female ‘trust’
viii
 treatment, which has data for both northern (rural) India 
and the south, but not for the urban north. In this treatment, only men have endowments and 
the allocation of the pool is the responsibility of the wife. The endowment is twice the amount 
given to individuals in the other investment treatments. 
 
In treatment 1, the investment baseline treatment, each subject, i, separately and privately 
receives an endowment of Ei = 160 Rupees. Each person then chooses an investment, xi 
from the set {0, 40, 80, 120, 160}. The investments of the 2 players are summed and 
multiplied by 1.5 and then each player receives half of the total.  
 
In the female control treatment each subject separately and privately receives the same sum 
as in treatment 1 and makes an investment decision from the same choice set. The 
investments are summed and multiplied in the same manner, but then the wife chooses how 
much to allocate to each person in the household. This decision is made using the strategy 
method. That is, after choosing her own investment, for each possible investment by her 
husband, she must make a conditional allocation of the pool. Once the husband’s actual 
investment is revealed, the allocation proceeds according to the conditional plan. Treatment 3 
is the same, except it is the husband who controls the allocation and must produce a strategy 
for dividing the pool between the spouses. 
 
In treatment 4, the private endowment is common knowledge. Otherwise this treatment is the 
same as treatment 1. In all but treatment 4, the private endowment Ei is known only to 
individual i., whereas the common account and the final allocation from that account is always 
common knowledge. We told participants that, 
 
The exact amount will vary between people, but you will receive something between 
0 and 160 Rupees. [Show the envelope.] Your wives will each receive a similar 
envelope and they will each receive an amount of money between 0 and 160 Rupees. 
They don’t know how much you have in your envelope and you won’t be told how 
much they have in their envelopes. None of you will know what the others have. 
In most treatments we did not reveal full information about each individual’s endowment in 
order to mimic the typical household situation. Asymmetric information about individual 
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resources and spending is a familiar and well-documented facet of household behaviour in 
many cultures (Pahl, 1990). Our own follow-up survey (see below) confirms its relevance for 
the samples in this experiment.  However, whether manipulating the information set alters 
behaviour is not clear cut. In past experiments, Munro et al, 2007, find that providing 
information about a partner’s choices makes no difference to behaviour in an experiment 
conducted on UK couples. However in her experiment on Philippine households and their 
savings decisions, Ashraf, 2009 concludes that transparency affects male (but not female) 
behaviour. In what is probably the closest parallel to our research, Mani, 2008 uses 300 
couples in rural Andhra Pradesh, recruited through an NGO that organises women's self-help 
groups. Players typically face 4 tasks including one baseline task where they must split 50 
rupees between a high return and a low return account (with the share going to each spouse 
fixed) and another task in which subjects split 50 rupees between a high return investment 
that goes to the spouse's private account or a low return account that stays with the investor. 
She finds that the separated spouses typically invest 70% to 80% of their investment in the 
high paying account that goes to the partner. Crucially, she has a full information and private 
information variations which make little difference to the results.  
 
It seems that the limited evidence available is mixed on the important issue of asymmetric 
information. It is worthwhile stressing that in our experiment the total surplus maximizer has 
no incentive to withhold contributions, even with asymmetric information, but of course 
players with different motives may wish to hide some or all of their endowment from their 
partner. This could be achieved by not placing some of the endowment in the common pool. 
However, because there are other motives for not investing which apply even if endowments 
are common knowledge, we cannot interpret all failures to invest as evidence of deceit. The 
clearest evidence of attempts to conceal resources is provided where the potential investor 
also controls the allocation (i.e. the wife in treatment 3). In this context we measure 
opportunism as the difference Ei – xi where xi is the investment made by player i who has a 
strictly positive endowment, Ei, and is the allocator.  
 
In treatment 5 subjects earn their endowments by assembling up to 8 matchboxes in a fixed 
time period. For each pair of matchboxes completed the experimenter’s satisfaction subjects 
were paid 40 rupees. Thus subjects could earn 160 Rupees – the same endowment as in 
treatments 1-4. The sexes were segregated for the production tasks, meaning that as in 
treatments 1-3, the endowment was private knowledge. After completing the task, subjects 
faced the same investment problem as in treatment 1.  We include a production task, 
because there is evidence (e.g. Cherry et al, 2002) from other types of experiments that 
individuals have different attitudes to money that is presented as a gift from the experimenters 
and money that is earned. There are also theoretical perspectives why behaviour might be 
different in our context. If individuals have more control rights over money that is earned then 
a spouse may be more willing to invest it in the publicly observable pool. 
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The experiments took place on 5 consecutive days in 2009. In each site, five locations were 
selected. In the case of rural sites, these five locations were distinct villages. The villages had 
been pre-selected in the month leading up to the main fieldwork using local informants, data 
from the 2001 census, and prior visits by members of the research team. The major selection 
criteria were size (we needed to recruit 80 couples from each place), rural location and 
separation from the other sites (to limit the possibility of cross-contamination). The villages 
selected in Uttar Pradesh are between 10 and 40 kilometres away from central Varanasi. 
Typically, people are cultivators (they grow vegetables, cereals (mainly wheat), pulses, some 
rice) and daily wagers (commute to Varanasi or to nearby town or perform some services 
inside the village). In Tamil Nadu the villages selected were approximately 40-60 kilometres 
north from Coimbatore. Coconut plantations and poultry farms dominate local agriculture, and 
a large number of villagers, including women, work in towns in the garment, powerloom and 
hosiery industries. There is a high rate of female workforce participation.  
 
For the urban location five wards out of 50 were randomly selected. Then within a ward, a 
named locality was selected that typically consisted of some 300 households on the criterion 
that we wanted lower income households. With the help of local corporators (the urban 
equivalents of the village pradhan (chief); as pradhans these are elected local 
representatives), lower-income parts of the wards were identified. The five urban localities 
selected were in three different U.P. assembly constituencies: Cantonment (Saketnagar, 
Lahartara), North (Sonarpura) and South (Khojwan, Nagawa). Livelihoods in these localities 
are very diverse but mainly consisting of various forms of self-employment in the informal 
sector, and daily wagers: very few are in regular salaried employment. Female labour force 
participation is high in these areas. Caste composition is skewed towards scheduled castes 
(SC), the next largest group is Other Backward Castes (OBC), and then there are very few 
forward castes members.    
 
In each location, prior visits gave us a list of possibly willing households. From that list we 
randomly selected 90 households per village, 10 of which were assigned to the reserve list 
(again randomly) to be used in the case of no-shows.  
 
The actual experimenters were 12 (6 female and 6 male) local researchers recruited through 
the advice of local partners from a local University.  Most of them had some background in 
Sociology or Economics. Some of them had experience with the implementation of household 
surveys. All of them were able to communicate effectively with the experimental participants 
in their local language, and to adequately understand the instructions they received in English. 
The experimenters received five days of training from three UK-based researchers from the 
project. The first day of training was used for explaining the principles of how to run 
experiments (what to do and what not to do with examples) and presenting all the treatments 
to be played in the region. On days 2 and 3 experimenters practised in the local language 
(and sometimes in English so that the team leaders could understand). On day 4 we ran a 
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pilot using a small sample of subjects.  The fifth day of training was used to give individual 
and collective feedback on the pilot, to explain the logistics for the game days and to 
distribute the material needed for the first 5 game days.
ix
  
 
The experiments used scripts translated into the local language and then back-translated into 
English. Each experimenter was also used to compare the English and the translated 
versions of 2 or 3 treatments. Discrepancies were then corrected by all experimenters during 
the training in the local language version. Across the 15 locations, venues were mixed and 
included middle and secondary schools as well as farm building with concrete floors and 
specially erected tents.  
 
The schedule for the 5 game days was as follows: 5 treatments in the morning and 5 
treatments in the afternoon. After welcoming the participants, husbands and wives were split 
in different rooms. Secrecy was ensured by calling one person at a time, with each husband 
going to one location with a (male) researcher and each wife going separately to another 
location with the (female) researcher.  Each spouse removed from their envelope what they 
wanted to keep for themselves, with the remainder left for the common account. The 
researcher collected their envelopes and recorded the decisions. At the end of the session, 
each couple was individually called and paid in private. For the production task, the sexes 
were segregated and subjects practised production before engaging in it for real. 
 
Results. 
We thus have an experimental design that tests for efficiency, and the impact on efficiency of 
whether endowments are earned, whether endowments are public, and the spouse who 
controls the allocation of the common pool. As explained above, these are all avenues 
through which the autonomy of individual spouses could lead to household inefficiency, as 
well as respects in which our northern and southern sites could differ. Before considering the 
experimental results, we begin by setting out some basic facts about our sample in Table 1. 
We then consider the survey data and compare the attitudes and lifestyles within our sample 
to those reported in Rahman and Rao, 2004, and Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001, which reach 
contradictory conclusions about the continued relevance of the Dyson and Moore thesis. We 
have two overlapping aims in doing this. The first is to validate our site selection, i.e. to check 
whether we have captured the north-south contrast using very similar methods to those used 
in the two studies just referred to. The second aim is to establish whether the key avenues we 
focus on through which household inefficiency could come about – individually earned and 
controlled resources, the possibility to conceal some of these, separate spheres of decision-
making – are each different across the sites in the way we expect them to be different. 
 
Interviewing a sample of 800 wives, Rahman and Rao, 2004, find a series of significant 
differences between the practices of conjugality in rural Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka, which 
they conclude does not point to systematic extra subordination of women in the north 
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compared to the south. By contrast, Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001, use very similar interviews 
of 1,842 women in sites in rural Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (the two states in which our 
sites are also located), and conclude that female autonomy is higher in their southern sites in 
almost all respects considered. For more details on these two studies, see the background 
section above. The tables which follow summarise our evidence on similar issues, drawn in 
our case from separate interviews with both husbands and wives.
x
 To a large degree we find 
very similar patterns in our rural and urban Uttar Pradesh locations, which in turn are typically 
very different to the average household in Tamil Nadu. Table 2, for instance, illustrates the 
differences in endogamy between north and south, which Dyson and Moore hold to be at the 
root of the regional divide in female autonomy. Marrying relatives is almost unheard of in our 
Uttar Pradesh samples, but common in Tamil Nadu. Wives are highly unlikely to be living in 
the maternal home in the north, whereas in both regions around 2/3 of men report that they 
are living in a household with their parents. Dowries were lower in the south compared to the 
north.
xi
 The last two rows of data in Table 2 report answers to questions about ‘typical 
community practices.’ Although spouses rarely split up in any of these sites, if they do it is 
relatively common for the wife to be allocated property (e.g. a house) upon divorce in Tamil 
Nadu, but almost unheard of in both urban and rural Uttar Pradesh. It is also notable that 
according to respondents in Tamil Nadu, prior ownership of property assets have little 
relevance for their allocation at divorce. For more mobile assets, such as cash and jewellery, 
allocation at divorce follows more closely the pattern of original ownership. For instance, with 
gold and jewellery, the percentage of respondents who state that wives would normally get 
jewellery on divorce is 18% if jewellery was owned by the husband at time of marriage and 
90.2% if it was the wife’s property. For gold jewellery bought after marriage the gap is only 
slightly less stark – the corresponding figures are 28% and 85%. 
 
TABLE 1. Background facts about the samples 
 Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Rural) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Urban) 
Tamil 
Nadu 
(Rural) 
Rural north 
versus rural 
south (p-
values) 
Experiment sample size 400 400 400 - 
Household survey sample size 393 376 400 - 
Mean age (wife) 41.8 39.7 39.9 0.040 
Mean age (husband) 46.1 44.1 47.3 0.260 
Mean years married 27.9 23.9 21.6 0.000 
Mean household size 7.31 6.10 3.70 0.000 
Mean no. of children 2.66 2.07 0.81 0.000 
% working in agriculture (husbands) 26.3 3.7 50.5 0.000 
Mean wife’s annual income (Rupees) 2787 4507 12618 0.000 
Mean husband’s annual income (Rupees)  44976 33848 40384 0.040 
Median Gross household wealth (Rupees) 103308 92729 141450 0.000 
 
Notes:  
1. p-values are for a two-sided Mann Whitney test, except for the % working in agriculture 
measures where we use a Fisher’s exact test. 
2. For income we use the figure reported by each person separately. For wealth, only 
husbands faced the relevant set of questions.  It is worth noting that median income for 
women is zero in both northern samples. In the south median female income is 2000 
Rupees per annum. 
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Table 3 provides some measures of perceived autonomy as reported by the women in our 
sample. Consider first the allocation of time. In both northern locations, unpaid work is the 
norm. In the south, unpaid work, including childcare is still the largest category (34.5%), but 
working on her own business (22.8%) and doing paid agricultural work (18.8%) are relatively 
common. In fact the proportion of women doing either agricultural or non-agricultural paid 
work is similar across all three locations. Tamil Nadu differs from the northern rural areas in 
the percentage of women who work in their own business in the south and in the higher 
percentage of southern women who work on the family farm. Similarly, women report less say 
in decisions that concern their ability to operate independently outside the home, earn private 
income and purchase private goods in the north. One bit of evidence on autonomy is 
conflicting, in that women are more likely to own their own assets in Uttar Pradesh. (Separate 
ownership of land was rare in both north and south, with about 4% of women in each location 
reporting they had land under their own name.) However, it could well be that this reflects the 
larger dowry paid in the north, which even if it is counted as part of a woman’s own assets, is 
highly unlikely to correspond with assets that she can dispose of as she sees fit. 
 
TABLE 2. Kinship and cultural practices 
 Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Rural) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Urban) 
Tamil 
Nadu 
(Rural) 
Rural north versus 
rural south  
(p-value) 
Marry relatives (%) 0.5 0.3 42.8 0.000 
Scheduled caste (%) 34.8 51.6 35.3 0.882 
Living with parents (women, %) 0.0 2.9 21.0 0.000 
Living with parents (men, %) 70.3 77.0 64.0 0.059 
Average dowry paid (Rupees)* 3192 4174 2336 0.000 
What happens upon divorce to house 
acquired jointly during marriage (% 
indicating house goes to wife) 
0.77 0.80 44.0 0.000 
What happens upon divorce to house 
husband brought to marriage (% indicating 
house goes to wife) 
0.00 0.27 40.5 0.000 
 Note the statistical tests are Fisher’s exact test, with the exception of the variable marked *, 
where a Mann-Whitney test is used.  The p-values are for the 2-sided test. 
 
 
TABLE 3. Indicators of Autonomy 
 Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Rural) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Urban) 
Tamil 
Nadu 
(Rural) 
Rural north 
versus rural 
south (Fisher’s 
exact, p-value) 
Wife spends most of the day on unpaid work (%) 50.90      62.50      34.50 0.000 
Wife is primary decision-maker about if she should 
work outside the home (%) 
1.28       0.53        30.75 0.000 
Wife need not consult husband about purchase of 
new sari (%) 
48.08      46.28      73.75 0.000 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 10-33
 - 14 - 
Wife has property (including jewellery) of her own (%) 64.63      79.73      23.25 0.000 
 
When asked what major change women would like to make to their lives, 78% of women in 
the south reported no change, compared to 36% in rural Uttar Pradesh and 31% in the urban 
sample. Of the dissatisfied, by far the largest desire was for more time for paid work or own 
business, which could partly be explained by the fact that wives of migrant or wage workers in 
Varanasi are often managing the daily running of the household farm but not involved in the 
marketing of its produce, so that they have neither time left nor income of their own.  
 
We asked both spouses who was the person primarily responsible for making decisions in a 
variety of areas.
xii
 Summary answers are given in Table 4, where as in Rahman and Rao, 
2004, we aggregate across several questions. There is some difference between urban and 
rural north, but the biggest gap is between north and south: women generally answered that 
they were the primary decision-maker more often in Tamil Nadu than in Uttar Pradesh. Men 
concurred with this view, but were more likely to nominate themselves as the main decision-
maker in the south. Whether we take the men or the women’s view our results are in contrast 
to those in Rahman and Rao 2004 (e.g. their Table 3) and more in line with the earlier 
conclusions of Dyson and Moore echoed in Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001. The differences 
across states in the results of individual questions are always in line with the pattern of the 
overall indices. In particular, we find women have significantly more say on major household 
purchases or general expenditure of income in the south compared to the north.  
 
TABLE 4. Indicators of Household Decision-making 
 Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Rural) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Urban) 
Tamil 
Nadu 
(Rural) 
Difference of rural north  
(Mann-Whitney test, p value) 
    Versus rural south Versus urban north 
Female view      
General index 0.112 0.138 0.460 0.000 0.044 
Children  0.035 0.019 0.410 0.000 0.045 
Spending 0.106 0.237 0.403 0.000 0.000 
Male view      
General index 0.103 0.150 0.383 0.000 0.011 
Children  0.025 0.036 0.325 0.000 0.676 
Spending 0.137 0.247 0.382 0.000 0.000 
The indices represent the average fraction stating that the wife is the primary decision-maker 
when one person must be nominated. Joint nominations are not allowed, though a secondary 
decision-maker can be given. The general index is derived from 10 questions, the children 
index is an average from 3 questions and the spending index is also an average of 3 
questions. The p-values are for a two-sided test. 
 
In general in answer to our questions about various decisions under 10% of women in any 
community reported that they were neither the first nor the second decision-maker. Notable 
exceptions to this occur in the questions of whether a wife should work outside the home and 
to whom to marry children. In the first case, 11 and 17% of husbands in urban and rural Uttar 
Pradesh respectively state that their wives are not the primary or secondary decision-maker. 
In Tamil Nadu the corresponding percentage is 4. In the second case, the percentages of 
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women with no say are 14, 19 and 25 in urban Uttar Pradesh, rural Uttar Pradesh and Tamil 
Nadu. (The figures for the two rural sites yield p=0.04 for a Fisher’s exact test of their 
equality.) Usually it is a child who acts as the co-decision maker though we have no 
information about whether this is the child facing marriage.  
 
Table 5 produces some general figures on trust and satisfaction. Overwhelmingly the men 
and women of Tamil Nadu are more satisfied with their current allocation of time. Amongst all 
regions, dissatisfied women and men sought more time for paid activities. For women the 
major obstacles to their goals were unsurprisingly finance and childcare responsibilities. For 
men, lack of finance dominated the explanations. We asked men and women what portion of 
a windfall they would hide from their partner and what portion they would expect their partner 
to hide? The figures shown amalgamate the responses of subjects who declared that at least 
half the sum would be hidden. This was relatively infrequent amongst both men and women in 
the north, but significantly higher in the south. In general, spouses’ expectations about their 
partners were close to what their partners declared in the north. The figures in the table 
suggest some (insignificant) tendency for men to plan to hide more than their wives were 
expecting and for wives to hide less than anticipated by their partners. However, when we 
look at the full range of figures this difference disappears. For instance 2/3 of men in Uttar 
Pradesh expect their partners to hide nothing, whereas in fact 50.8% of urban wives and 
42.2% of rural wives state that they would hide nothing. The gap between expectations and 
plans is starker in the south, where 50% of men would hide at least half their windfall, but only 
22.8% of women predicted such behaviour. Women were less likely to hide at least half, 
compared to the expectations of their husbands. Thus in short, men and women in the north 
were more trusting and trustworthy towards their partners, compared to subjects from the 
south, and their expectations were more accurate. 
 
TABLE 5. Indicators of Trust and Satisfaction 
 Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Rural) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Urban) 
Tamil 
Nadu 
(Rural) 
Rural north versus 
rural south (Fisher’s 
exact test, p-value) 
Female view     
Nothing I wish to change (%) 47.1 49.5 87.8 0.000 
Hide at least half a windfall (%) 14.3 5.6 39.8 0.000 
Partner would hide at least half a windfall (%) 11.9 8.7 22.8 0.000 
     
Male view     
Nothing I wish to change 35.9 31.5 78.0 0.000 
Hide at least half a windfall (%) 14.5 10.9 50.0 0.000 
Partner would hide at least half a windfall (%) 15.0 6.9 49.3 0.000 
 
Table 6 summarises normative beliefs about appropriate behaviour. The table shows 
responses to questions where subjects were asked directly to agree or disagree with 
statements about appropriate household behaviour. As with the other responses, there are 
clear differences between north and south, but it would be wrong to categorise these along a 
one dimensional scale of conservatism (where for the sake of the table we define this 
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ambiguous concept as agreement with the statements). Women and men in the northern 
state were significantly more likely to agree that a husband’s permission was required for a 
woman to work outside the home and that a woman should follow the instructions of her 
elders. However, women and men in Tamil Nadu were more likely to believe that the man 
should have the last word and that priority should be given to boys in education.  Between 
question variation in percentages is similar for men and women, but husbands were 
significantly more likely to believe in obedience to elders. Significantly, men in the north were 
much more likely to agree that a woman’s wages should be handed over to him, both 
compared to their wives and to men in the south. 
 
In a second set of questions, details of which are omitted here, subjects were asked to 
indicate their beliefs about what most people in their community would think. We asked 
specifically about potential occasions when it was generally viewed as acceptable for men to 
beat wives. On the whole, men and women gave similar answers, with couples in the northern 
state significantly more likely to agree that a beating was seen as usual when, for instance, a 
wife neglected the cleaning, was suspected of an affair or went out without telling her 
husband.  
 
TABLE 6. Indicators of normative beliefs 
 Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Rural) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Urban) 
Tamil 
Nadu 
(Rural) 
Rural 
north 
versus 
south 
Female view (% agree or strongly agree)     
1. A man should have the final say in all family matters  48.97      18.40      78.25 0.000 
2. If a woman works she should give her money to her 
husband 
23.58      22.93      66.25 0.000 
3. A woman needs her husband’s permission to do paid 
work 
94.06      96.53      75.50 0.000 
4. It is a woman’s job mainly to take care of the home and 
cook for her family 
28.24      23.92      66.00 0.000 
5. A woman should always follow instructions by elders 
(particularly by her in-laws) whether she likes them or 
not. 
75.13      70.93      57.75 0.000 
6. A wife should tolerate being beaten in order to keep her 
family together 
35.62      39.20      54.25 0.000 
7. Boys should get priority when family cannot send all 
children to school 
9.71       7.20        46.25 0.000 
8. It is better to let the wife handle the money of the house 87.96      96.53      73.00 0.000 
Male view (% agree or strongly agree)     
1. A man should have the final say in all family matters  56.89      27.35      76.00 0.000 
2. If a woman works she should give her money to her 
husband 
62.24      62.20      57.00 0.148 
3. A woman needs her husband’s permission to do paid 
work 
83.16      86.60      69.00 0.000 
4. It is a woman’s job mainly to take care of the home and 
cook for her family 
41.65      37.37      55.75 0.000 
5. A woman should always follow instructions by elders 
(particularly by her in-laws) whether she likes them or 
not. 
93.01      90.59      73.00 0.000 
6. A wife should tolerate being beaten in order to keep her 
family together 
70.39      69.44      49.00 0.000 
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7. Boys should get priority when family cannot send all 
children to school 
32.12      27.88      53.25 0.000 
8. It is better to let the wife handle the money of the house 83.21      91.96      80.25 0.321 
 
The last table in this section examines the extent to which wives and husbands gave similar 
answers. Take the ‘congruence on primary decision-maker’ entries as an example. If the 
figure in a column was 1 this would mean that across 9 questions about who was the primary 
decision-maker, all couples in the sample agreed in every single instance. A figure of 0 would 
mean that all couples disagreed in their responses on all 9 questions. In practice, congruence 
on primary decision-maker was high in Uttar Pradesh and significantly lower in Tamil Nadu. In 
fact in all cases, the figure for Tamil Nadu is significantly lower than that for rural Uttar 
Pradesh.
xiii
 We also asked both spouses questions about their partner’s income. 
Approximately 86% of men in rural Uttar Pradesh gave a figure for the wife’s income that was 
within 5,000 Rupees of the figure she gave. For Tamil Nadu the corresponding statistic was 
only 29.8%. Agreement on husband’s income was lower in the northern state, but still 
significantly higher than the figure for Tamil Nadu.  
 
 
TABLE 7. Indicators of congruence in attitudes and beliefs 
 Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Rural) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
(Urban) 
Tamil 
Nadu 
(Rural) 
Rural north 
versus rural 
south (p-
values) 
Congruence on primary decision-maker 0.815 0.809 0.551 0.000 
Congruence on prime responsibility 0.349 0.316 0.308 0.000 
Congruence on normative beliefs 0.433 0.422 0.323 0.000 
Congruence on community norms 0.459 0.437 0.359 0.000 
Agreement on wife’s annual income 
(% within 5,000 Rupees) 
86.15 73.88 29.81 0.000 
Agreement on husband’s annual income (% 
within 5,000 Rupees) 
48.09 59.15 34.25 0.000 
Notes:  
1. The congruence figures are fractions of average congruence across groups of related 
questions (19 prime responsibility, 9 primary decision-maker, 8 normative beliefs and 7 
community norms).  For a household, a figure of 1 would represent that both partners 
gave the same responses on all relevant questions; a figure of 0 represents disagreement 
on all responses.  
2. p-values are for a two-sided Mann Whitney test, except for the income questions where a 
2-sided Fisher’s exact test is employed. 
3. The agreement on wife’s income variable is for women reporting a non-zero income. 
Agreement is more common once zero-earning women are included, but the North-South 
gap remains large and significant.  
 
This section compared the results of our survey to that in Rahman and Rao, 2004, and 
Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001. We find significant differences between north and south and 
these distinctions are present whether we look at statements by female respondents or at the 
responses made by men. In general, urban and rural northern samples are very similar. Men 
in the north have more decision-making say and women have less autonomy compared to the 
south. Of specific relevance for our study, we find that the key respects in which greater 
autonomy of individual spouses could translate into inefficiency all differ across sites in the 
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way we would expect. First, women are in a position to secure their own resources more 
frequently in the south: they earn their own income more often, and earn a higher income on 
average than in the north. Second, spouses hide their resources much more frequently from 
each other in the south. Third, almost invariably and in a large number of spheres, women are 
more frequently the primary decision-maker in the south than in the north. Rahman and Rao 
find some evidence that women in the north have relatively more say in particular decisions. 
We do not find supporting evidence for this. The impression that spouses act much more like 
a unity, if an enforced unity, in the north is reinforced by the strikingly larger congruence of 
views on the identity of the primary decision-maker and on normative beliefs, as well as by 
the much more accurate knowledge of the size of one’s spouse’s income and prediction of 
what one’s spouse would do with a windfall. 
 
With both spouses controlling resources independently, inefficiency becomes a possibility, a 
fortiori so when spouses do not fully observe each other’s exercising that control. 
Independent and partly unobserved command of resources is present in each of our sites, but 
to a much greater degree in the south, which therefore has more scope for inefficiency. We 
next consider the extent to which inefficiency in fact differs across our sites. 
 
Experimental Results.  
As we noted above, in all 10 treatments were conducted in each sites with 40 couples in each 
cell. Below we concentrate on the 5 treatments common to all three sites, though from time to 
time we bring in additional material from comparisons that are incomplete across locations, 
such as the female trust treatment, which has data for both northern (rural) India and the 
south.  Table 8 provides a useful starting point, showing mean rates of investment by women 
across treatments and sites.   
 
Table 8. Mean fraction of Female Endowment Invested. 
 Uttar Pradesh, 
Urban 
Uttar Pradesh, 
Rural 
Tamil Nadu All sites. 
Investment baseline 0.731*** 0.494 0.500 0.575 
Female control 0.531 0.538* 0.456 0.508** 
Male control 0.656*** 0.519 0.444 0.540 
Female trust - 0.697** 0.578 0.638* 
Public endowments 0.775*** 0.569*** 0.381 0.575 
Production with investment 0.775*** 0.717*** 0.481 0.658** 
Average 0.694*** 0.589*** 0.473 0.579 
In the ‘Uttar Pradesh’ columns asterisks indicate statistical difference to corresponding 
treatment in Tamil Nadu, using a Mann-Whitney test. In the ‘All sites’ column, asterisks 
indicate statistical difference to the investment baseline treatment. 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level, 2 tailed test. 
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The geographical pattern for men (see Table 9) is broadly similar to that for women:  
 
Table 9. Mean fraction of Male Endowment Invested. 
 Uttar Pradesh, 
Urban 
Uttar Pradesh, 
Rural 
Tamil Nadu All sites. 
Investment baseline 0.731*** 0.681* 0.581 0.664 
Female control 0.544 0.606 0.513 0.554*** 
Male control 0.625 0.606 0.556 0.596** 
Public endowments 0.706*** 0.600* 0.488 0.598** 
Production with investment 0.710* 0.717** 0.604 0.677 
Average 0.663*** 0.642*** 0.548 0.618 
Male-female - *** *** *** 
In the ‘Uttar Pradesh’ columns asterisks indicate statistical difference to corresponding 
treatment in Tamil Nadu, using a Mann-Whitney test. In the ‘All sites’ column, asterisks 
indicate statistical difference to the investment baseline treatment.  In the ‘male-female’ row, 
asterisks indicate statistical difference to the corresponding female figure and omits the 
incomplete ‘Female trust’ treatment from the comparison. *** significant at 1% level, ** 
significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level, 2 tailed tests. 
 
Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the women’s data across the sites for the 5 universal 
treatments.  
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Figure 1. Average Investment Rates by Women for Site and Treatment. 
 
Figure 2 provides a similar picture of the mens’ data across the sites for the five common 
treatments.  
 
 
Figure 2. Average Investment Rates by Men for Site and Treatment. 
 
There are seven basic messages in the data presented in the figures and tables, which are 
robust to the introduction of controls from the household survey data. 
1. First, across all sites and treatments, men and women do not invest all of their 
endowments – surplus is not maximized outside of a small number of households. In the 
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south only one household invests all its endowment. In the rural north, around 7% of 
households invest all and in the urban north approximately 15% of couples invest 
everything. Higher rates of investment are found in some treatments, but in no case does 
the mean rate of investment exceed 80%. 
2. With few exceptions, the investment figures for Tamil Nadu are significantly below those 
for the northern sites. This applies to both men and women and across treatments. Men 
and women rarely invest all their endowment in the south and are more likely to keep the 
majority of their endowment themselves. For example, from these 5 treatments 116 
women invest everything: 82 in urban Uttar Pradesh, 26 in rural Uttar Pradesh and only 3 
in Tamil Nadu. For men the corresponding figures are 87, 55 and 2. The south also differs 
in the responses to treatments as we discuss further in points 5 and 6. 
3. In the rural areas, women generally invest less than men. Although the overall gap is 
highly significant, differences within treatments are not always significant. In urban Uttar 
Pradesh, there are no significant differences between male and female investment rates, 
which are similar across treatments. In addition as we discuss below the response to 
treatment varies between rural sites.  
4. The two northern sites are clearly distinct from the south and there are many similarities 
between them. However, in general investment rates are higher in the urban location, 
particularly for women. For instance, the average investment rate for women across the 5 
comparable treatments in Table 8 is significantly higher at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney 
test) in the urban area, compared to the rural Uttar Pradesh sites. 
5. Comparing behaviour across treatments, the effects of control (perhaps better labelled 
responsibility), are ambiguous. Generally assigning control to one person (i.e. comparing 
the baseline investment treatment to either of the control treatments), lowers investment 
rates for both sexes. The effect is particularly stark in urban Uttar Pradesh. Compared to 
female control, male control produces higher investment rates for men and women in the 
same site, but elsewhere, there are marginal, but not significant falls in female investment 
and rises in male investment as control is moved from wife to husband.
xiv
 
6. We hypothesised above that making endowments transparent may raise investment rates. 
Theory suggests this and there is some, conflicting evidence from other experiments. 
Here, for men there is a significant difference between the baseline and public treatments, 
but it is in the unanticipated direction: men invest less when all decisions are revealed to 
spouses. For women the treatment effect differs sharply between regions. In the north, 
investment appears to be higher in the public treatment, although this difference is not 
significant even if we pool the two northern sites. In the south, investment by women falls 
in the public treatment to under 40% of endowments. The difference between baseline 
and public treatments is significant at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney test, two-tailed).  So 
we can conclude that in the south both men and women invest less in the public 
treatment.  
7. Except amongst women in rural Uttar Pradesh there is no significant effect on investment 
from asking subjects to earn their endowments. Investment amongst women in rural Uttar 
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Pradesh rises significantly when endowments are produced, but elsewhere and for men 
we find no statistically significant pattern.  
 
Next we report regression results for the investment decision to see if our conclusions are 
robust to the introduction of controls. Given that the fraction of endowment invested is 
censored at 1 and 0 and since we have a reasonable number of subjects who invest all their 
endowments, we use a Tobit model. In Table 11, for the first regression without controls we 
see the same basic features of the data that are already reported: investment by women is 
highest in the Northern urban setting. In the next two columns we consider interaction effects. 
In the same setting investment is lower when females control the allocation. In the rural Uttar 
Pradesh location, treatments have no significant impact on investment, except earning the 
endowment, which has a positive impact.  In the south there are no significant treatment 
effects save for the public endowment treatment at the 5% level (two sided t-test).   
 
In the final two columns of Table 11, we see results when controls are included. The equation 
shown reflects a number of features in which the controls are grouped into three broad groups 
(which potentially overlap). First we have the standard demographic characteristics. Then we 
have some potential measures of bargaining power, such as distance to parent’s house and 
number of relatives living nearby. Finally we have the questionnaire responses about the 
state and organisation of the marriage. In interpreting the results, it is worth first noting that a 
large variety of controls were tried. Though they are largely significant we have left in 
standard demographic characteristics, in part because we anticipate that readers will be 
curious about their correlation with game play. With the other groups of variables we have 
been selective, dropping variables with low p-values and selecting one from a group of 
variables when there were high levels of collinearity.
xv
 We also include the fraction believed to 
be invested by the spouses’ partner, omission of which might cause bias in the estimated 
coefficients. Inclusion though is problematic since the partner’s contribution and therefore 
beliefs about it are potentially endogenous. In theory instruments can be used for the belief  
variable. In practice though, it is almost impossible to find variables that influence one 
partner’s decisions but not beliefs about those made by the other partner. In the case of 
female investment, we use distance to mother’s house and number of relatives living with 15 
minutes as instruments. A Wald test does not reject the null of non-endogeneity (p=0.95) and 
so we present results in which belief about partner’s investment is not instrumented.  
 
When we look at the results for women, we see that first the conclusions of the previous 
section largely stand: women invest less in the south and most in the urban north. The 
apparent source of this effect though is intriguing since the simple regional dummies are 
positive for the south and insignificant for the rural north. However, while the coefficient on 
beliefs about partner’s investment is 0.810 for the urban north and highly significant, it is only 
0.087 (=0.810-0.723) and insignificant for the south. The rural north is somewhere in between 
these two values, but also significantly different from zero. So, if we treat beliefs as 
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exogenous, then it is as if women reciprocate or match male investment in the north, but 
choose their investments independently of men in the south. Moreover, compared to women 
in the south, wives in the urban north also believe their husbands will invest more (0.67 on 
average versus 0.46 in the south and 0.57 in the rural north) and this coupled with the higher 
beliefs coefficient drives the regional differences in investment levels.   
 
When we consider the controls, standard demographic variables are largely insignificant. The 
exception is years of marriage and the dummy for non-membership of scheduled caste or 
scheduled tribe. For women there is evidence about whether proximity to family raises 
investment levels. Living closer to mother is associated with higher investment. Meanwhile 
living with a mother-in-law (which is common in all three regions) is linked to higher 
investment in the northern urban sites, but has no significant effect elsewhere, even in the 
rural north. There is some evidence that other measures of decision-making power are 
associated with investment levels: working on her own (non-farm) business is associated with 
higher investment for women.  There is also some evidence that women invest less when 
they feel that they have less leisure than their husbands. Quantitatively the largest effects for 
women are her beliefs about her partner’s investment, region, non-membership of a 
scheduled caste, tribe or other backward group, having her own business and living within 
half a day of travel to her mother.  
 
Below the table for women we have the corresponding table for men. As with the women, we 
considered a number of other potential explanatory variables to the ones shown, none of 
which were stable or robust to changes in the specification. We also examined the 
endogeneity of male beliefs and accepted the null of exogeneity in a Wald test.  As for women, 
however, we do not have good instruments for beliefs. In the investment behaviour, we see 
the lack of difference between the urban and rural sites in the north. When we add further 
controls a common feature is their lack of significance. There is a positive association 
between a husband’s investment and his belief about what his wife has invested. Unlike that 
for women this correlation is not regionally sensitive, so that although men are not 
reciprocating as much as women in the north, they reciprocate more than women in the 
south.
xvi
 As with women there is some evidence of a quantitatively significant association 
between investment behaviour and not being a member of a scheduled tribe, or caste or other 
backward caste.  
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Table 11a. Women’s investment. 
Basic Site interactions With controls Dependent variable: Fraction of 
endowment invested by women Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Constant 0.759*** 21.7 0.790*** 15.6 0.145 1.31 
North, Rural -0.182*** -5.60 -0.299*** -4.26 0.0547 0.59 
South, Rural -0.314*** -9.71 -0.290*** -4.14 0.304*** 3.26 
Female control -0.0769* -1.88 -0.241*** -3.43 -0.207*** -3.15 
Male control -0.0311 -0.76 -0.0745 -1.05 -0.0464 -0.71 
Public endowment 0.0205 0.50 0.0966 1.32 0.0560 0.83 
Earned endowments 0.130*** 3.12 0.113 1.53 0.0696 1.01 
North, Rural x Female control   0.292*** 2.97 0.285*** 3.15 
North, Rural x Male control   0.116 1.17 0.0969 1.08 
North, Rural x Public endowment   -0.00061 -0.006 -0.0148 -0.16 
North, Rural x Earned endowments   0.176* 1.73 0.167* 1.80 
South, Rural x Female control   0.198** 2.02 0.153* 1.74 
South, Rural x Male control   0.0114 0.12 -0.0264 -0.30 
South, Rural x Public endowment   -0.215** -2.15 -0.168* -1.86 
South, Rural x Earned endowments   -0.122 -1.22 -0.0928 -1.01 
Belief about spouse’s investment     0.818*** 9.99 
North, Rural x Belief     -0.359*** -3.13 
South, Rural x Belief     -0.725*** -6.43 
Household size     0.00418 0.67 
Number of children     0.00538 0.50 
Husband’s income     -3.32e-07 -0.94 
Wife’s income      -1.52e-06 -1.38 
Husband’s age     -0.000337 -1.24 
Wife’s age     -0.000503 -0.14 
Years married     0.000852 0.26 
Has no education (dummy)     -0.0296 -1.13 
Scheduled tribe dummy     -0.107 -1.40 
Scheduled caste dummy     0.0128 0.51 
Other group dummy     0.113** 2.14 
Living with mother-in-law (MIL)     0.169*** 3.59 
North, Rural x MIL      -0.178*** -2.78 
South, Rural x MIL      -0.214*** -3.58 
Works on her own business     0.0958** 2.40 
More than ½ day to mother’s house     -0.102** -2.01 
Your marriage (omitted: other)       
Husband earns and gives most     0.0424 1.02 
Husband earns most and gives some     0.0320 0.79 
Both spouses earn money and keep it     0.0362 0.72 
Wife must consult before buying sari     -0.0216 -0.90 
Best to hand money to wife (1 = 
strongly agree)     
-9.70e-05 -0.49 
She has more leisure time dummy     0.0424 1.02 
N 600  600  568  
Invested nothing 12  12  12  
Invested all 111  111  100  
Log likelihood -250.5  -236.2  -132.7  
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The omitted caste dummy is OBC = Other backward caste. 
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Table 11b. Men’s investment. 
Variable: Men’s investment Basic 
Site 
interactions With controls 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Constant 0.763*** 21.71 0.792*** 15.34 0.672*** 4.79 
North India, Rural -0.0291 -0.90 -0.0673 -0.92 -0.00616 -0.06 
South India, Rural -0.164*** -5.09 -0.211*** -2.95 -0.326*** -3.08 
Female control -0.135*** -3.26 -0.227*** -3.16 -0.193*** -2.65 
Male control -0.0834** -2.01 -0.138* -1.92 -0.0830 -1.19 
Public endowment -0.0801* -1.93 -0.0320 -0.44 -0.0421 -0.60 
Earned endowments 0.0286 0.68 -0.0154 -0.21 -0.000241 -0.00 
North, Rural x Female control   0.122 1.20 0.146 1.45 
North, Rural x Male control   0.0488 0.48 0.0420 0.42 
North, Rural x Public endowment   -0.0701 -0.69 -0.00915 -0.09 
North, Rural x Earned endowments   0.0899 0.87 0.0766 0.78 
South, Rural x Female control   0.152 1.51 0.108 1.12 
South, Rural x Male control   0.113 1.13 0.0743 0.79 
South, Rural x Public endowment   -0.0720 -0.71 -0.0424 -0.45 
South, Rural x Earned endowments   0.0428 0.42 -0.0192 -0.20 
Belief about spouse’s investment     0.460*** 5.53 
North, Rural x Belief     -0.124 -1.04 
South, Rural x Belief     0.201 1.53 
Household size     -0.00219 -0.32 
Number of children     -0.0114 -0.98 
Husband’s income     2.49e-07 0.60 
Wife’s income     -8.31e-08 -0.07 
Husband’s age     -0.00337 -1.10 
Wife’s age     -0.000997 -0.89 
Years married     0.00333 1.09 
Has no education (dummy)     -0.0110 -0.37 
Scheduled tribe dummy      0.0695 0.84 
Scheduled caste dummy     -0.0335 -1.21 
Other group dummy      0.0981* 1.71 
Living within 15 mins:       
Number of husband’s relatives     0.000159 0.84 
Number of wife’s relatives     0.000468 1.36 
Wife’s time to travel to mother’s house     -0.00642 -0.12 
Your marriage (omitted: other)       
Husband earns and gives most     -0.0129 -0.22 
Husband earns most and gives some     -0.0297 -0.49 
Both spouses earn money and keep it     -0.0272 -0.41 
Wife must consult before buying sari     0.0271 0.98 
Best to hand money to wife (1 = strongly 
agree)     
0.0123 0.67 
Leisure (omitted: she has more )       
Equal leisure time     -0.0419 -0.92 
He has more leisure     -0.0211 -0.45 
N 600  600  551  
Invested nothing 19  19  18  
Invested all 108  108  92  
Log likelihood -264  -260.2  -176.7  
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; OBC = Other backward caste. 
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Allocation behaviour: during and after the experiment. 
The main focus of the paper is on the investment decision, but we now briefly analyse the 
allocation to wives in the female and male control treatments. As Iversen et al, 2006 note, 
allocation involves intrahousehold transfers which are potentially reversible after the 
experiment. In that sense such decisions are different to investment choices, which affect the 
total returns to the household. Nevertheless, allocation decisions can be informative about 
patterns of money-sharing within the household whenever there is some deviation from 
income-pooling.  For both male and female control treatments we used a strategy method to 
elicit allocations conditional on the partner’s investment. This provides 5 data points per 
household (i.e. allocations based on 0, 40, 80, 120 and 160 Rupees by the partner). Table 12 
summarises the results. As a benchmark, note that a coefficient of 1.5 on the decision-
maker’s investment means that all of the returns from a marginal increase in investment are 
returned to the investor. For each spouse we show three specifications: one without controls 
(random effects) and a fixed and random-effects specification using the same control 
variables. For both sexes a Hausman tests accepts the null of no difference in the 
comparable coefficients at high probabilities (p =0.998, p = 0.885 for women and men 
respectively), suggesting that the random effects estimator is preferable.  
 
There are some stark differences between male and female allocation behaviour. Female 
allocation to herself is highly correlated with her own investment and with that of her partner’s. 
She gives her spouse half of the marginal returns from her own investment, but slightly less 
from his investment. There are no significant site effects on the treatment of own investment, 
but there are for her husband’s investment. Notably, women in the two rural areas take 
significantly more of their husband’s investment. Women also take more from their spouses’ 
investment when more of their husband’s relatives live close by, when the wife has relatively 
more leisure (as she sees it) and when she has her own business.  These effects are large, in 
the sense that for a woman with none of her husband’s relatives close by, where husband has 
more leisure and where she works on her own business, her marginal take from her 
husband’s investment is close to 0.15 for an urban, Northern woman. Conversely, if she lives 
in the south, has more leisure, an average number of husband’s relatives living close by and 
she does not have her own business, the take from her spouse’s investment is close to 1.35. 
For women, the other, demographic variables have little explanatory power, whether they are 
entered (as in the specification shown) on their own or via interaction terms with spousal 
investment.  
 
If we consider Table 12b, the male intercept is positive, but not significant.  The marginal 
return to the wife from the husband’s investment is not significantly different from 1.5. In other 
words the typical husband gives his wife all the marginal returns from his own investment. He 
also claims only a fraction 0.211 of her investment, meaning that she gets 1.279 from each 1 
rupee invested.  There are no significant site effects for the coefficient on his investment, but  
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men in the rural north give less back to their wives compared to urban men and men in the 
south.  
 
Table 12a Female Allocation in the Experiment. 
 
Dependent variable: allocation to self (Rupees) 
Basic, 
Random 
effects 
With controls, 
Fixed effects 
With controls, 
Random effects 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Constant -11.74 -0.70 64.75*** 24.78 5.076 0.20 
Own investment 0.927*** 5.52   0.723*** 5.73 
Site (omitted: Urban north)       
Rural North 18.71 0.67   -7.199 -0.53 
Rural South 32.12 1.28   -1.374 -0.10 
Spouse’s investment 0.824*** 17.94 0.921*** 9.79 0.918*** 10.43 
Own investment x       
Rural North -0.243 -0.84     
Rural South -0.360 -1.28     
Spouse investment x       
Rural North 0.190*** 2.92 0.189*** 2.68 0.193*** 2.78 
Rural South 0.0825 1.27 0.233*** 3.17 0.243*** 3.38 
Number of husband’s relatives living within 15 
mins 
  0.0068*** 4.11 0.0073*** 4.91 
Number of wife’s relatives living within 15 mins   -0.00059 -0.31 -0.00049 -0.28 
More than ½ day to mother’s house   -0.122 -1.35 -0.104 -1.27 
Leisure dummy (omitted: she has more leisure)       
Equal leisure time   -0.137* -1.69 -0.146** -1.97 
He has more leisure   -0.416*** -4.58 -0.440*** -5.34 
Works on her own business   -0.275** -2.57 -0.302*** -3.11 
       
Household size     0.638 0.22 
Number children     -0.547 -0.12 
Husband’s income     4.71e-05 0.18 
Wife’s income     -0.000183 -0.52 
Husband’s age     -0.563 -0.42 
Wife’s age     0.556 0.40 
Years married     0.0011 0.04 
Wife has no education (dummy)     14.19 1.26 
Caste (omitted: OBC)       
Scheduled caste     30.83 1.00 
Other backward caste     -9.322 -0.93 
Other     -5.325 -0.25 
Number of groups 120  112  112  
Number of observations 600  560  560  
R
2
 within 0715  -  0.738  
R
2
 between 0.291  -  0.398  
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; OBC = Other backward caste. Based on answers from the 
‘female control’ treatment. Variables below ‘spouse investment x’ to ‘household size’ are interacted 
with spouse investment. 
 
For men, there is very little correlation between other variables and allocation to the wife. An 
exception is the ‘best description of the household’ variable, where we see that husbands 
tend to allocate more to themselves when they perceive that both spouses earn money and 
keep it.  Against this, men give a higher return to wives when the women live further from their 
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mother’s home. Men also give more to wives with low or no education, at the margin and in 
lump-sum form. Other standard demographic variables explain very little of the variation. Age, 
household size, income and number of children have no significant effect. We also tried 
specifications that included occupation for instance, but again there was no evidence of 
correlation.  
Table 12b Male Allocation to Wife in the Experiment. 
 
Dependent variable: allocation to wife 
(Rupees) 
Basic, 
Random effects 
With controls, 
Fixed effects 
With controls, 
Random effects 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Constant -51.40** -2.35 104.6*** 44.31 37.02 1.27 
Own investment 1.668*** 8.44   1.504*** 12.25 
Site (omitted: Urban north)       
Rural North -2.663 -0.09   -14.99 -1.03 
Rural South 35.18 1.02   -10.01 -0.66 
Spouse’s investment 1.168*** 27.14 1.210*** 14.07 1.229*** 14.96 
Own investment x        
Rural North -0.0846 -0.31     
Rural South -0.384 -1.12     
Spouse investment x       
Rural North -0.180*** -2.96 -0.225*** -3.54 -0.227*** -3.60 
Rural South 0.0450 0.74 0.0349 0.54 0.0286 0.45 
Number of husband’s relatives living within 
15 mins 
  0.000266 0.98 0.000346 1.37 
Number of wife’s relatives living within 15 
mins 
  -0.000498 -0.31 -0.000525 -0.35 
More than ½ day to mother’s house   0.270** 2.25 0.247** 2.21 
Both spouses earn money and keep it   -0.234*** -3.00 -0.280*** -3.84 
Wife requires husband’s permission to work?   -0.0134 -0.36 -0.0200 -0.58 
Wife has no education   0.121** 2.12 0.120** 2.10 
Husband has no education   -0.187*** -2.99 -0.181*** -2.90 
       
Household size     -3.318 -1.35 
Number children     -0.849 -0.18 
Husband’s income     0.000250 1.15 
Wife’s income     -0.000457 -0.92 
Husband’s age     -0.437 -0.25 
Wife’s age     -0.872 -0.47 
Years married     -0.0116 -0.30 
Wife has no education      31.65** 2.45 
Husband has no education      -8.331 -0.57 
Caste (omitted: OBC)       
Scheduled caste     -25.27 -0.64 
Other backward caste     -16.35 -1.42 
Other     -8.592 -0.39 
Number of  households 120  116  116  
Number of observations 600  580  580  
R
2
 within 0.811  0.830  0.830  
R
2
 between 0.591  0.102  0.691  
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; OBC = Other backward caste. Based on answers from the 
‘male control’ treatment. Variables below ‘spouse investment x’ to ‘household size’ are interacted 
with spouse investment. 
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It is interesting to consider briefly the implications of taking the allocation data at face value 
and comparing it to the baseline treatment in which each partner faced a marginal return of 
0.75 from investing in the pool.  With male control the female return to her investment 
exceeds 1.2 and is significantly higher than 0.75 at the 1% significance level. This would 
suggest a greater incentive for women to invest. Nevertheless female investment is generally 
lower than in the baseline.  This is a puzzle; it may be the result of a biased prediction of the 
husband’s behaviour but it is also consistent with female risk aversion in the face of 
uncertainty over the rule the husband would follow. 
 
After the experiment, as part of the household survey, we asked questions about subject’s 
perceptions of their partner’s behaviour and also about what they did with the winnings after 
the experiment. Some results are summarised in Table 13, where we use the whole sample. 
As with the other data, we have stark differences between north and south. In line with the 
regional differences in autonomy, both men and women in the south were more likely to keep 
all their winnings compared to the northern subjects. Female subjects in the north favoured 
their children as recipients, whereas in the south the gap between spouse and kids as targets 
was smaller. Conversely, in the north, men were more likely to favour spouses than their 
children, a gap that was all but closed in the south. Wives in the south believed that men gave 
money away about half as frequently as men said that they passed on winnings. Meanwhile, 
men underestimated their wives’ propensity to hang on to winnings in the south.  
 
Table 13. Reported Uses of Experimental Winnings After the experiment. 
Wife     Husband    
 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
urban 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
rural 
Tamil 
Nadu   
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
urban 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
rural 
Tamil 
Nadu 
Gave none 
away 27.1 33.8 62.0  
Gave none 
away 10.9 18.8 35.3 
Gave some 
to spouse 7.5 9.6 15.3  
Gave some 
to spouse 77.2 59.2 46.6 
Gave some 
to kids 58.4 45.2 25.9  
Gave some 
to kids 10.0 20.4 44.4 
         
Husband’s view: deviation from wife   Wife’s view: deviation from husband 
 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
urban 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
rural 
Tamil 
Nadu   
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
urban 
Uttar 
Pradesh, 
rural 
Tamil 
Nadu 
Gave none 
away 10.2 5.2 -24.8  
Gave none 
away 1.0 6.0 25.3 
Gave some 
to spouse 12.4 18.3 15.6  
Gave some 
to spouse 3.6 -14.2 -24.7 
Gave some 
to kids -20.2 -16.0 8.2  
Gave some 
to kids -4.4 -1.0 -26.2 
1. Subjects were allowed to nominate up to 4 possible recipients of their winnings. In 
practice few reported more than two categories of recipients and most reported 1 or 
zero. Very few categories other than children or spouses were nominated.  
2. In the ‘view’ section of the table the statistic is (the partner’s view – the original 
recipient’s view). Thus, a positive figure for ‘gave none away’ indicates that fewer 
spouses report the subject gave money away, compared to the subjects’ own reports. 
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About 25% of men in urban Uttar Pradesh report that they gave all their money away. Other 
groups report much lower figures. It is notable that 75% of men but only 30% of women in the 
south refused to say what they did with money they kept. In the north the relevant 
percentages were around 40% with no significant gap between the sexes. Out of those willing 
to reveal their expenditure plans, saving for the future was the most popular category 
amongst southern women (115 out of 400 nominated it first), whereas spending on the 
household as a whole topped the list in the north for women (117 out of 400). Spending on 
children ranked second in the north and third in the south, behind spending on the household. 
Saving for the future was nominated by only a handful of women in the north. Recall that very 
few southern men would reveal what they did with their winnings, but amongst northern men, 
spending on themselves and spending on the household were the equally likely categories, 
with children someway behind. As with the wives, savings were nominated by less than 5% of 
the participants who retained some money.  
 
 
Discussion. 
We have conducted a large scale experiment with 2400 people and an accompanying survey 
in three distinct locations in India. The survey data confirms the continuing existence of 
prominent differences in the conjugal circumstances of households between north and south. 
Differences between urban and neighbouring rural communities in the north are less sharp. 
The social distinctions between north and south are mirrored in the way participants played 
the games: investment was generally closer to its maximum possible limit in the north for both 
men and women. Nevertheless in all our locations putting all into the common pool by both 
spouses was an uncommon strategy, in contrast to the results obtained by Iversen et al, 2010 
where, for similar games played amongst couples in Uganda, the modal choice was full 
investment. For our games the modal investment was 75% of endowment for men and just 
25% for women. As such our results have much in common with those of Mani’s (2008) 
experiment in Andhra Pradesh where couples typically passed on the opportunity to maximize 
the household’s total payoff from the game.   
 
The intriguing results of the full information treatment suggest that an unwillingness to invest 
all the endowment is not driven by the opportunity to hide money from spouses. In fact men 
invested less in the full information treatment in all our sites, while investment rose for women 
in the north, but fell in the south. Such results are in keeping with those found in our non-
Indian sites, in Ethiopia (Kebede et al, 2011) and Nigeria (Munro et al, 2010), and also with 
the results of Munro et al, 2007 for the UK. There is no evidence in our post-experiment 
surveys and interviews that individual spouses doubted their ability to hide payoffs from their 
partners.   
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Comparing regions, the broad outlines of our results are compatible with a theory where there 
is a trade-off between autonomy and efficiency, such as Lundberg and Pollak’s separate 
sphere’s model. In Tamil Nadu, where women have more autonomy their investment in the 
common pool is lower.  This suggests that more opportunities for spouses’ mutual gains are 
left unrealised in the region with greater female autonomy. As we stressed in the introduction, 
this is not of course to suggest that the female autonomy is not worth having, nor to close our 
eyes to the numerous benefits we know it brings: lower fertility, better child health and 
education, as well as a lower gender disparity in them, and so forth. It is simply to indicate 
that there may be a penalty to pay for these benefits in terms of the efficiency of household 
decision-making. 
 
Meanwhile, the regression yields evidence of almost no reciprocity amongst women in the 
south. Within regions the results are suggestive of a link between autonomy and efficiency but 
not definitively so: variables such as having her own business play a part in explaining 
variation in investment rates in the regression analysis, but measures of household say are 
largely insignificant and there remain some quantitatively significant north south differences in 
the way the games are played that are not captured by differences in answers to standard 
questionnaires about conjugality. Of notable interest is the fact that women invest less if their 
mothers live further away. Living with a mother-in-law is associated with a significant positive 
effect on investment in the urban north, but not elsewhere.   
 
Sen (1990) conjectured that women identify more closely than men with the household as a 
whole, which would lead them to contribute more to the common pool than men. Yet, even in 
the treatments where females are in control of allocation wives typically contribute less than 
their husbands.
xvii
 The larger investments by husbands are consistent with a conjugal world in 
which husbands are expected to provision the household and wives’ contribution is 
discretionary. In fact, control may be a misnomer here; rather it is responsibility that may be 
assigned by the treatment and it seems that men and women respond in different ways to the 
burden. In every location, men invest less than in the baseline when one or other partner is 
assigned responsibility for dividing the common pool. Meanwhile, when allocating the payoffs 
our regression results indicate that men favour spouses over themselves while women favour 
themselves.  If men take the allocation rules embodied in these regressions as a given, their 
treatment response to changes in control is consistent with a degree of self-interest on men’s 
part - i.e. they invest less because they know they will receive less back. Women’s response 
to changes in responsibility varies across regions: investment falls compared to the baseline 
in the south and the urban north, but it rises in the rural north, albeit only slightly.  What men 
do and women do in rural Uttar Pradesh is mutually consistent
xviii
, but in the other two 
locations, the responses of men and women are mutually inconsistent, unless we allow for 
some other intervening factor such as errors in expectations about the behaviour of their 
partners. In fact Table 13 gave support for such an explanation in Tamil Nadu: there we saw a 
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significant mismatch between the reports of wives and husbands in the south. That still leaves 
unresolved the results in urban Uttar Pradesh and here we can only speculate. We noted 
earlier that risk aversion may play a role in investment decisions when individuals do not 
know how the proceeds will be finally allocated. In such a situation a move from a fixed 
allocation rule to one where an individual partner divides the pool can lead to an outcome in 
which both partners lower investment.   
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Endnotes. 
 
                                                 
i
 The review of ethnographies they rely on is Karve’s (1965) Kinship Organization in India, 
while adopting Sopher’s (1980) and Miller’s (1981) understanding of how northern and 
southern kinship structures respectively translate into gender relations and discrimination. 
ii
 ‘[Whereas] the ultimate historical “cause” of differences between north and south may lie in 
agrarian ecology [J] [c]ontemporarily [J] there simply is no clear spatial correspondence 
between cultural variation [J] and differences in agrarian ecology’ (Dyson and Moore 1983: 
47). 
iii
 This study, reported on in Jejeebhoy (2001) and in Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001), uses for 
its India component a sample of 1,842 women; the fieldwork took place in 1993/94. 
iv
 As an aside, we note that questions about female autonomy are often asked only to female 
respondents. In our case we ask both male and female spouses questions about female 
autonomy, which in some cases provides interesting contrasts in responses. 
v
 Generally in such models each spouse contributes to a distinct set of household public 
goods. Thus Lundberg and Pollak’s assumption that the spouses control separate spheres 
can be relaxed without materially changing the outcome of their model. 
vi
 Generically, in the sense that if for instance there are no household public goods then y
h 
= 0 
can yield efficiency.  
vii
 The factors which raise autonomy may also influence the weight, λ in the second stage of 
the model. Such changes can alter the observed relationship between autonomy and 
efficiency. For instance, consider a rise in female power that increases λ and y
f
 
simultaneously. If the change in  λ is sufficiently large, then the outcome of the first stage of 
the game may no longer constrain the solution to the second stage. In other words, the rise in 
female power increases efficiency. However, as long as consider changes in autonomy 
keeping λ constant the inverse relationship between autonomy and efficiency holds.  
viii
  The label ‘trust game’ derives from this format’s typical use in a laboratory game played 
between non-couples.   
ix
 We also had 2-3 days of training for the survey enumerators. 
x
 Major differences between samples: we include a sample of nearly 400 from urban Uttar 
Pradesh; we interview both men and women. Our sites are geographically more clustered and 
are subjects are overwhelmingly Hindu (by design). Rahman and Rao also by design include 
a variety of different levels of prosperity in their sample.  
xi
 Our figures for dowries are substantially lower than those given in Rahman and Rao. We 
selected low income villages and urban districts, whereas in each region they chose 2 
prosperous districts out of 5 in total.  They also report a very high variance, which suggests 
that a relatively small number of large dowries may drive their figures.  
xii
 For instance, what food to prepare for family meals, whether to purchase major goods for 
the household such as a (TV)? whether or not you should work outside the home? How many 
children to have? Whether to purchase or sell gold/silver jewellery? Inviting guests to your 
home? What to do if a child falls sick? How much schooling to give your children? To whom to 
marry your children? How overall household income is spent? These questions are very 
similar to those asked in Rahman and Rao, but we simplify the answering format, with 
subjects asked to nominate the primary decision-maker and then a secondary decision-maker 
if appropriate. 
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xiii
 In the underlying questions responses were typically – though not exclusively – more 
extreme in Uttar Pradesh. This raises the probability that a partner picked randomly from the 
sample would give a similar answer. In other words, the picture of marital congruence in the 
north might be overstated from these figures. 
xiv
 Iversen et al, 2006  report that assigning responsibility to women raises investment by both 
men and women. The different results here underline the ‘one size does not fill all’ conclusion 
of the earlier paper. 
xv
 For such variables, such as the variables for control and say in marriage we have also tried 
factor analysis and indices. This did not produce results significantly different or superior to 
the ones shown.  
xvi
 In bivariate correlations, men’s beliefs about women’s investment are more accurate than 
women’s beliefs about male investment. 
xvii  This is obviously an average. In fact, in about 40% cases men investment more than 
wives, in 32% cases men and women invest the same and in 28% of households it is women 
who invest the most. Even in Tamil Nadu, 21% of wives invest more than their husbands, a 
sharp reminder of the diversity of responses in our experiment. 
xviii
 Rural Uttar Pradesh is also consistent with this interpretation for two other treatments that 
we ran there: one in which all the common pool goes to the wife and the trust game in which 
the wife invests and the husband allocates. In both cases wives invest significantly more than 
in the baseline.  Meanwhile men’s investment is lower in the trust treatment where men invest 
and the wife allocates.  
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Appendix. An example of the Instructions:  women in the Male control treatment. 
 
Instructions for Participants 
 
[ both partners present] 
 
Welcome. Thank you for taking the time to come today. [Introduce EXPERIMENTERS and 
the assistants.] You can ask any of us questions during today’s programme. 
 
We have invited you here because we want to learn about how married couples in this area 
take decisions. We will ask you to make decisions about money. Whatever money you win 
today will be yours to keep. 
 
You will be asked very simple questions. Questions that do not have a correct answer, they 
are just about the way you think. For example, what is your favourite colour [ask someone in 
the room]? We cannot say that this answer is right or wrong. It is just your opinion and it can 
be different from the opinion of others in this room. However it is important to think seriously 
about your answers because they will affect how much money you will take home. 
 
What you need to do will be explained fully in a few minutes. But first we want to make a 
couple of things clear. 
 
• First of all, this is not our money. We belong to a research organization, and this 
money has been given to us for research. 
 
• Second, this is a study about how you make decisions. Therefore you should not 
talk with others. This is very important. Please be sure to obey this rule because it 
is possible for one person to spoil the activity for everyone. I’m afraid that if we 
find you talking with others, we will have to send you home, and you will not be 
able to earn any money here today. Of course, if you have questions, you can 
ask one of us. 
 
• Third, the study has two parts: today’s exercise is one, but we will also visit you in 
your homes in the coming weeks to ask both the husband and the wife a number 
of questions. 
 
• Finally, make sure that you listen carefully to us. You will be able to make a good 
amount of money here today, and it is important that the instructions are clear for 
you so that you can follow them. 
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Would wives now please go with [Thea] and husbands with [Theo]? The task will then be 
explained to you. 
 
[Instructions for wife] 
 
In a moment I will give you an envelope containing money. The exact amount will vary 
between people, but you will receive something between 0 and 160 rupees. [Show the 
envelope.] Your husband will receive a similar envelope and he will also receive an amount of 
money between 0 and  160  rupees. He doesn’t know how much you have in your envelope 
and you won’t be told how much he has in his envelope.  
 
You have to decide how much money to take out of the envelope and how much to leave in. 
Any money you take out of the envelope is yours to keep. Your husband will be making the 
same decision with his envelope.  
 
After you have made your decision and your husband has made his decision we will bring you 
together again. We will put all the money that you and your husband have left in your 
envelopes into one envelope. We call it, the common envelope. To whatever is in the 
common envelope we will add another half again. So, if there are 80 rupees in the common 
envelope we will add another 40 rupees to make the total 120. If there are 320 rupees in the 
common envelope we will add another 160 rupees to make a total of 480 rupees and so on.  
 
Both of you will know the total amount of money in the common envelope.  
 
After that your husband will decide how to split the money in the common envelope. He has to 
decide how much to give to you and how much to keep for herself. In a moment we will give 
you some time to think about how much money you want to leave in your envelope.  
 
Let me ask some questions to check whether you understood the instructions. 
1. If you have 160 rupees in your envelope and you take out 80 rupees how much will 
be left in the envelope? [record the answer, correct participant if necessary] 
2. If you put 80 rupees into the common envelope and your husband puts in 80 rupees 
how much will there be in total? 
3. How much we will add if there is 160 rupees in the common envelope?  
 
[Record each answer, correct participant if necessary] 
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[Responses to common questions: to be used only when subjects ask] 
 
1. If you are asked whether the husband and wife will have the same amounts in their 
envelopes, answer: possibly, possibly not. 
2. If you are asked what ‘what should I do’, you should say that it is ‘your decision and I 
am not allowed to offer advice’ 
3. If you are asked precise arithmetical questions then answer them precisely. E.g if I 
put in 160 rupees and my husband puts in nothing how much will you add to the 
total?’ Answer: 80 rupees. 
 
[Once the experimenter is sure that the participant has understood the activity, give him/her 
some time to make his/her decision in private. DON’T FORGET TO KEEP RECORD OF THIS 
DECISION.] 
 
Thank you. We will now rejoin your husband and put the money from your two envelopes into 
the common envelope.  
 
[Bring husband and wife together & resolve the game.] 
 
[Experimenter looks up the allocation decision and executes it. Subjects are given their 
money and thanked] 
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